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Abstract: 
Digital advertising markets are growing and attracting increased scrutiny. This paper explores 
four market inefficiencies that remain poorly understood: ad effect measurement, frictions 
between and within advertising channel members, ad blocking and ad fraud. These topics are not 
unique to digital advertising, but each manifests in new ways in markets for digital ads. We 
identify relevant findings in the academic literature, recent developments in practice, and 
promising topics for future research.  
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Digital advertising markets have offered unprecedented innovations to marketers. Businesses can           
now advertise to finely targeted sets of individuals with customized commercial messages at             
specific locations and times in a variety of formats. Compared to traditional advertising, digital              
ads promise better targeting and relevance, personalized ad content, programmatic sales based on             
real-time auctions, and measurement of the co-occurrence of individual consumer ad exposures            
with a variety of online and offline response behaviors. These features have fundamentally             
altered marketers’ spending: digital advertising revenues reached $108B in 2018, up 117% over             
2014 (IAB 2019), with expectations to grow 19% and surpass cumulative traditional advertising             
revenues in 2019 (eMarketer 2019a).  
Digital advertising markets sell a wide variety of search and display advertising            
opportunities to marketers. Although digital advertising is 25 years old, market structures are still              
changing rapidly. For example, a census of marketing technology firms showed an increase from              
150 in 2011 to 7,040 in 2019 (Brinker 2019). The IAB Tech Lab recently introduced a series of                  
broad-based initiatives, including a new real-time bidding standard, and Google moved from            
second-price to first-price auctions for display ads. Publishers have introduced a variety of ad              
formats, with spending typically following consumer attention and media usage: after initial            
growth in desktop display and search, recent growth has been more concentrated in social              
networking, video, audio, and mobile ads.  
Yet there are indicators that unregulated markets for digital advertising have experienced            
problems. The E.U. has fined Google more than $9 billion in three antitrust cases and the U.S.                 
Federal Trade Commission fined Facebook $5 billion after it broke a 2012 consent order (Case               
19-cv-2184). Prominent politicians have criticized the industry and proposed structural reforms.           
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New privacy laws mandate transparency and consent requirements for data-driven advertising           
and user identification practices.  
Several comprehensive reviews of digital platform markets have advised new regulation.           
For example, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2019) made 23           
recommendations, including that “a specialist digital platforms branch be established” to           
proactively monitor digital markets, enforce laws, conduct inquiries and recommend actions to            
address consumer harm and market failure. The U.K. House of Lords Select Committee on              
Communications (2019) reached similar conclusions, noting “a lack of understanding among           
policy-makers.” Similar conclusions have been reached by the European Commission          
Directorate-General for Competition; the U.K. Department of Digital Culture, Media & Sport;            
and the U.K. Digital Competition Expert Panel; with ongoing investigations by the U.S. Federal              
Trade Commission and the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority, among others.  
The purpose of this article is to review four prominent features that may limit digital               
advertising markets from reaching their maximum allocative efficiency (i.e., the extent to which             
markets distribute digital advertising opportunities to the agents that value the opportunities            
most, as in Harberger 1954).  The four topics are as follows. 1
- Ad effect measurement is the estimation of incremental effects of advertisements on            
consumer behaviors. Ignorance or uncertainty about ad effects may inefficiently distort           
advertisers’ reservation prices, demand, budgets and bids for ads. 
1 We focus on allocative efficiency because it is a classic and fundamental measure of market performance, and is a 
frequent criterion economists use to recommend and evaluate government policies. We do not intend to discount 
other policy objectives such as consumer welfare, distributional concerns, competitiveness or innovation. 
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- Organizational inefficiencies occur within advertising organizations and between        
advertisers and their self-interested agencies, and may lead to inefficient advertising           
decisions. 
- Ad blocking is a consumer technology that prevents ads from being displayed. Ad             
blockers may inefficiently appropriate advertising revenues and harm publishers’         
incentives to provide content. 
- Ad fraud is a collection of practices that misrepresent advertising inventory or disguise             
machines as humans in order to steal advertising expenditures. Most industry estimates            
indicate that fraud takes 10-30% of total digital advertising revenue.  
These features are important: 75% of brand marketers indicated ad effect measurement to be the               
leading “threat to digital ad budgets in 2019,” with 69% of agency professionals reporting ad               
fraud as the leading threat (Benes 2019). We dedicate one section to each topic, selectively               
describing relevant scientific literature and credible industry knowledge, and identifying          
opportunities for future research. Although we discuss each issue in isolation, they may interact              
to exacerbate some of the inefficiencies we describe. We close with a broader discussion of               
policy-relevant research opportunities.  
It is important to note that these four inefficiencies predate digital advertising markets.             
More than 100 years ago, an executive famously claimed that half of his ads were working, but                 
lamented his inability to measure which half. The first newspaper advertising agent represented             
advertisers but was paid commissions by publishers (Crouse 2010). Ad blocking has affected             
television ad markets via the remote control, video cassette recorder and digital video recorder.              
Numerous media outlets have fraudulently over-reported circulation numbers to increase ad           
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prices. Traditional advertising markets developed partial solutions; for example, the Audit           
Bureau of Circulation verifies print publishers’ audience data. Yet all four inefficiencies manifest             
differently in digital advertising markets than in traditional advertising markets, and therefore are             
likely to require different solutions. 
We write for several audiences. Many aspects of digital advertising markets remain            
poorly understood, so we describe opportunities for future research. We hope these might appeal              
to academics and also to the rapidly growing number of scientists employed by large technology               
companies (Athey and Luca 2019). We also write for business practitioners who may seek to               
understand digital advertising markets, to make individual campaigns more efficient, or to            
develop new ventures that can enhance market efficiency. Finally, we hope to help policy makers               
understand root causes of inefficiencies in digital advertising markets. Extant investigations have            
given less attention to the four inefficiencies discussed below than to other issues (e.g., antitrust,               
brand safety, disinformation, consumer privacy, market transparency, etc.). We do not take a             
position on whether or how governments should regulate digital advertising markets, but we             
hope this article will help to inform policy makers about certain key issues. 
 
Digital Advertising Effect Measurement  
 
What is Ad Effect Measurement? 
Advertising effect measurement is the process of quantifying the incremental effect of an             
ad on consumer behavior. The incremental (or causal or marginal) effect of an ad is the                
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incremental number of outcomes that were obtained as a result of the campaign, such that these                
outcomes would not have occurred in the absence of the campaign.  
Firms measure ad effects to quantify the incremental return of their marketing            
investment--to determine whether their money was well spent--and to use this information to             
help guide future marketing decisions. Other motivations may include satisfying internal           
reporting requirements or benchmarking one campaign’s performance against others.  
Broadly speaking, campaign outcomes can be divided into two groups: branding and            
direct response (DR or performance). Brand advertising seeks to enhance the firm's long-term             
prospects by improving consumers’ perceptions, attitudes, and awareness of the brand. However,            
quantifying these metrics, and linking them to profits, can be difficult. In contrast, a DR               
campaign is about driving immediate results on a conversion metric, such as purchases, store              
visits, registrations, downloads, or webpage visits. Our discussion of ad effects primarily            
involves DR campaigns, although it is important to recognize that brand advertising represents a              
significant portion of online ads.  2
In many ways, advertising measurement boils down to answering a simple question: did             
the campaign work? And yet advertising measurement is anything but simple. The purpose of              
this section is to highlight common measurement challenges, to review measurement techniques,            
and to propose questions for future research. This review is intentionally selective and should not               
be viewed as exhaustive, as our strategy is to convey the challenges and methods insofar as they                 
explain market inefficiencies and motivate suggestions for future work.  
2  Advertisers sometimes rely on other metrics to evaluate ad effects, such as “copy testing” metrics or social media 
engagement metrics. In display and search campaigns, some advertisers focus on the number of ad clicks, even 
though that measure is directly proportional to total campaign expenditure and may come at the expense of free 
clicks on organic search results.  
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Measurement Challenges  
The practice of ad measurement is hardly new. However, there is a sense that digital               
advertising measurement presents a mix of both old and new challenges. These challenges             
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
1. Measurement and data availability​. Despite the volume and granularity of data available,            
many advertisers are still unable to connect ad exposures to outcomes at the individual              
level. Among other reasons, this is due to long purchase cycles, unobserved stages of              
consumer decision-making, and a lack of access to distribution channel members’           
customer data. Proving the connection between measurable outcomes, such as clicks or            
likes, and bottom line metrics, such as sales, is another common struggle. 
2. Strategic advertiser behavior​. Marketers often target their advertising (based on timing,           
characteristics, location, etc.) based on expectations of future demand, e.g., a car dealer             
advertising a temporary price reduction before a holiday weekend. Ad treatment often            
correlates with ad response--and possibly other marketing actions, such as temporary           
price reductions--creating a confounding correlation between ad levels and outcomes          
(Barajas et al. 2016). 
3. Strategic platform behavior​. Digital platforms optimize their advertising delivery. For          
example, if a digital advertising platform is paid per click, the platform attempts to show               
ads to consumers with high predicted click probabilities, creating another source of            
confounding variation. 
4. Strategic consumer behavior​. Consumers may pay attention to, or withhold attention           
from, advertisements according to ingrained habits or their valuation of the ad content             
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(Becker and Murphy 1993; Tuchman, Nair and Gardete 2018). As a result, it may be               
difficult for advertisers to distinguish incremental effects of ads from consumers’           
baseline propensities to attend to the brand’s ads. An implication is that many ad              
experiments recover something closer to an intent-to-treat effect rather than average           
treatment effects or treatment-on-the-treated effects. 
5. The complexity of ad effects​. Advertising effects may be nonlinear in the number and              
types of ads a consumer sees. Marginal effects of ads vary with wear-in, wear-out or               
weariness (Chae, Bruno and Feinberg 2019, Schmidt and Eisend 2015); competitor           
advertising (Danaher, Bonfrer and Dhar 2008, Shapiro 2018); and ads in other media             
(e.g., Naik and Raman 2003, Joo et al. 2014, Lewis and Nguyen 2015). The inability to                
measure all of a consumer’s advertising exposures makes it difficult to obtain a fully              
accurate view of ad effects in many settings. 
The severity of these challenges varies across campaigns, but all represent significant obstacles             
to quantifying ad effects reliably and accurately. 
Next, we discuss the two major approaches to measuring ad effects: designing strategies             
to create experimental data ​ex ante or analyzing observational data ​ex post​. Randomized             
experiments have become increasingly common as a number of online ad platforms provide such              
capabilities to advertisers, although usage still appears to be limited. In contrast, methods that              
rely on observational data are often more accessible, and thus have broad adoption by marketers.               
The next two subsections discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each approach with brief              
discussions of some representative work. The final subsection discusses some promising           
directions for future research.  
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Experimental Studies of Advertising Effects  
Advertising experiments are widely considered the gold standard to estimate the effects of a              
marketing action on consumer behavior. Experiments randomly allocate units (e.g., consumers           
or markets) across treatment and control conditions. With sufficient sample sizes, on average the              
only difference between conditions is advertising in the treatment condition. Incremental           
conversions can be calculated by comparing outcomes between the advertising treatment           
condition to conversions in the no-advertising control condition. 
By creating exogenous variation by design, randomized experiments address a subset of            
the measurement problems discussed earlier. A randomly allocated control group directly           
addresses the problem of strategic advertiser behavior by inducing exogenous variation in            
treatment. Furthermore, most online ad platforms implement experiments in a balanced manner            
across conditions so as to neutralize the issue of strategic platform behavior. 
The academic literature increasingly uses experiments to understand advertising effects,          
including influential collaborations between academics and firms. The pioneering work includes           
a collection of papers by Randall Lewis, David Reiley, and Justin Rao, who explored the               
effectiveness of digital display advertising on Yahoo.com by randomizing the ad shown to             
different visitors (Lewis, Rao and Reiley, 2011; Lewis and Reiley, 2014). This work was among               3
the first to make clear both the benefits and difficulties of relying on large-scale online               
experiments for the purposes of ad effects measurement. Lewis, Rao and Reiley (2015) provides              
an excellent review of the early academic literature on measuring digital advertising effects. 
3 Field experiments in marketing go back more than 30 years, e.g. in direct mail (Bawa and Shoemaker 1987, 
Chapman 1986) and television advertising (e.g., Eastlack and Rao 1989, Lodish et al. 1995). 
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Sometimes the unit of randomization is at the geographic market level, rather than the              
individual consumer. In these cases, researchers have often relied on quasi-experiments or            
matched market tests to generate suitable treatment and control groups (Vaver and Koehler,             
2011; Kalyanam et al. 2017).  
A particularly influential geo-experiment was documented by Blake, Nosko and Tadelis           
(2015), in which eBay halted Google search advertising in a sample of cities and continued               
search ads in other cities. Prior to the study, eBay believed sponsored search was effective at                
generating incremental sales. However, the results indicated a return on advertising spending            
(ROAS) of negative 63%. The main reason was that consumers easily substituted to organic              
search results for eBay when the sponsored links were removed. This was possible because              
eBay’s organic links ranked highly and competitors’ keyword ads appeared infrequently. 
eBay’s market leadership position makes it natural to wonder whether these results would             
generalize to firms with weaker market positions. This observation motivated at least two             
subsequent studies. First, Coviello, Gneezy, and Goette (2017) used the same market-level            
research design to evaluate paid search at Edmunds.com, for which organic search results do not               
enjoy the same high rank as eBay. The authors found that half of paid traffic was lost when                  
branded paid search was turned off. Second, Simonov, Nosko and Rao (2018) also found that the                
result did not hold similarly for most other online retailers, as competitors could poach branded               
keyword searchers when the focal brand does not purchase ads on its own keywords. These two                
papers suggest that the findings in Blake, Nosko and Tadelis (2015) might be limited to               
companies with a similar market position as eBay, and highlight the challenges in generalizing              
results from any single experiment to other settings. 
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Major digital platforms increasingly offer tools for advertisers to run experiments to            
measure incrementality on their platforms. These tools are usually offered freely, though            
sometimes only to sufficiently large advertisers, with the goal of helping them improve their              
advertising outcomes--the implicit assumption being that this will lead to increased advertising            
spend on the platform. A non-exhaustive list of platforms that offer experimentation tools             
includes AdRoll, Facebook, Google, JD.com, MediaMath, Microsoft and YouTube. Although          4
these tools are increasingly popular, widespread adoption by advertisers may take some time. 
One piece of systematic public evidence about advertisers’ usage of experiments comes            
from Simonov and Rao (2019). This paper examined online retailers’ search advertising            
expenditures at Bing.com during the period when the results from Blake, Nosko and Tadelis              
(2015) were publicized in the trade press and popular media. Simonov and Rao (2019) found that                
11% of firms whose branded keyword ads were not regularly purchased by competitors (similar              
to eBay) discontinued brand search advertising. However, the incidence of experimental           
advertising variation was essentially unchanged, and was uncorrelated with the size of individual             
firms’ advertising effects. To summarize, some firms reduced their ad spend on their own              
branded keywords after the eBay study results were publicized; but it appears that they did so                
without running their own tests first. 
A common problem with ad experiments is that many ad effects are small and require               
surprisingly large sample sizes to achieve reasonable statistical power. Lewis and Rao (2015)             
4 Google: See Johnson, Lewis and Nubbemeyer (2017a) and 
https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/intl/en-gb/marketing-resources/data-measurement/ 
a-revolution-in-measuring-ad-effectiveness/. Facebook: See Gordon et al. (2019) and 
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/552097218528551?helpref=uf_permalink​. Microsoft: 
https://about.ads.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/post/july-2019/experiments-test-your-campaign-changes-with-confidenc
e​. YouTube: ​https://www.blog.google/products/ads/new-tools-creative-storytelling-youtube/​. AdRoll: AdRoll 
(2019). MediaMath: Chalasani et al. (2017). JD.com: Du et al. (2019).  
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reported the results of 25 digital display advertising field experiments with samples of 500,000              
people or more. Despite large sample sizes, most experiments produced confidence intervals for             
ROAS wider than 100%, with the smallest confidence interval exceeding 50%. Advertising            
response data are highly variable, making it difficult to separate advertising’s influence on             
conversions from unobserved factors.  
The difficulty of measuring small advertising effects is a fundamental problem for            
advertising measurement. Whereas a product’s price acts like a hammer upon consumer            
behavior, advertising is perhaps closer to a feather in a strong wind. 
Cost is another barrier. Every consumer held out of the treatment group is a consumer               
who does not see the ad. If the ad is profitable, the firm may be unwilling to bear the opportunity                    
cost of not treating consumers in the control group. Compounding this problem, some digital ad               
experiments serve consumers in the control group with public service announcements at the             
advertiser’s expense. When ad effects are unknown, one might reasonably regard experiment            
costs as either positive or negative, depending on one’s prior about the ad effects.  
Lower costs of experimentation might increase the number of ad experiments that are run              
(e.g., Schwartz, Bradlow and Fader, 2017). Johnson, Lewis and Nubbemeyer (2017a) proposed            
“ghost ads” as a method to “identify ads in the control group that would have been the focal                  
advertiser’s ads had the consumer been in the treatment group.” Google implemented ghost ads              
and has reduced experimentation costs by an order of magnitude. Johnson, Lewis and             
Nubbemeyer (2017b) present a meta-study of 432 field experiments at Google that used the              
ghost ads design. Ghost ads appears to be gaining traction within the advertising industry              
(Nanigans 2019). 
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Another approach to lowering ad experiment costs was proposed by Sahni, Narayanan            
and Kalyanam (2019) in the context of retargeting (i.e., targeting ads to previous website              
visitors). They used a single-impression public service announcement campaign to tag all            
consumers who were eligible for retargeting ads. This created a single control group, offering a               
valid baseline to estimate treatment effects of multiple varying advertising intensities. 
As low-cost experimentation technologies continue to be developed and gain wider           
acceptance, we expect advertisers to increasingly adopt--and perhaps even demand--          
experimentation services on other advertising platforms. 
Observational Studies of Advertising Effects 
Most firms either ​do not ​or ​cannot ​measure ad effects using experimental or quasi-experimental              
methods. Instead, most firms rely on observational data collected in the normal course of              
business. In such cases, academics and firms have developed many techniques to estimate ad              
effects from observational field data. 
Probably the most common approach among firms is to analyze the market-level            
relationship between sales and advertising. This top-down approach is known as a Marketing             
Mix Model (MMM), or similarly a Media Mix Model, dating back to at least the 1960s (Borden                 
1964). The model normally takes the form of a time-series or panel regression of aggregate sales                
on aggregate marketing spending, or impressions, in each advertising medium. Additional           
controls include factors such as macroeconomic conditions, weather, seasonality, other          
marketing mix variables (e.g., price) and competitor activity. Once estimated, the model can be              
used to measure ROAS and to forecast sales at different levels of marketing spending in different                
channels. 
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Chan and Perry (2017) present an excellent discussion of the uses of MMMs,             
highlighting pitfalls and identifying opportunities for improvements. There are several arguments           
in favor of MMMs. First, the scope at which they operate---aggregate spending---allows MMMs             
to play a key role in a firm’s budgeting process, helping the firm to divide its market budget                  
across media. It would be difficult for many firms to implement a sufficient number of               
experiments to trace out ad effects across spending levels and media, whereas an MMM relies               
only on historical data. Second, the firm does not bear any opportunity costs of holding back                
advertising from a control group. Third, firms are more often capable of satisfying the technical               
and data requirements of MMMs. Fourth, MMMs can help socialize the overall concept of              
advertising measurement within the organization, which might help build internal support for            
more rigorous measurement practices in the future.  
In the absence of exogenous variation, these methods rely on the assumption that they              
produce valid incremental effects. However, given the challenges of advertising measurement           
raised earlier, we should expect that some of the variation in advertising levels is not independent                
of the error term, as firms often divide advertising budgets across time, markets and products in                
expectation of future demand. Furthermore, ad spending in different media tends to be highly              
correlated, making it difficult to isolate channel-specific ad effects. To be clear, these concerns              
represent significant hurdles to the potential causal interpretation of effects obtained from            
observational data. But with that said, in many situations this is the most feasible path advertisers                
can take, so many make do with imperfect ad effect estimates to inform their decision making.  
In contrast to settings with aggregate data, another common paradigm is to use             
individual-level data (or cookie-level data) to measure advertising effects. In these cases,            
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advertisers often apply Multi-Touch Attribution (MTA) ​models, which are bottom-up          
approaches that seek to assign credit (to attribute) to each ad that preceded a user’s conversion.                5
For example, suppose that a user clicks on a sponsored search ad, then clicks on a display ad, and                   
then makes buys the advertised product online. To what extent did either ad contribute to               
generating the conversion? The most common approach is a last-click attribution model that             
assumes that the display ad is solely responsible for the conversion, because it occurred last.               
Many variations on this style of model exist and a survey indicates their usage is widespread                
(Forrester Consulting 2014). 
A related measurement approach using individual-level data compares the conversion          
rates of users who were exposed to an ad campaign with users who were not exposed (e.g.,                 
Abraham 2008; often called “lift”). Lift methods rely on consumer characteristics data and model              
the joint likelihood of exposure and conversion to estimate the ad effect. The hope is that, after                 
controlling for enough characteristics, the two groups are similar to the point where the ad effect                
can be given a causal interpretation. However, because exposure is influenced by advertiser and              
platform targeting strategies, conversion differences between groups may be caused by strategic            
behavior or unobserved characteristics, even in the absence of advertising.  
Recent work by Gordon et al. (2019) demonstrates the difficulty of using observational             
data to estimate valid incremental ad effects. They re-analyzed 15 Facebook ad experiments             
comprising 1.6 billion ads served to 500 million users. Despite having rich data, they were               
unable to recover true ad effects accurately or consistently using observational methods. Even             
the sign of the bias was unpredictable: most ad effects were overestimated, but some were               
5 See Abhishek, Despotakis, and Ravi (2017) and Berman (2018) for theoretical analyses of multi-touch attribution. 
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underestimated. As the authors put it, “even good data prove inadequate to yield reliable              
estimates of advertising effects.” 
Fortunately, it is possible to use observational data to address some of the advertising              
measurement problems. In general, quasi-experimental approaches make use of specific          
information about the timing of events or the data generating process to lend a causal               
interpretation to the estimates, and may require additional assumptions. Causality is not free. 
One such approach is found in Nair et al. (2017). The data they analyzed came from a                 
casino which had previously targeted promotions to consumers based on their observed gaming             
behaviors. The authors exploited knowledge of the firm’s previous targeting policy to obtain             
unbiased estimates of consumer response to promotions. They used the estimates to segment             
consumers and showed, via a field experiment, that the segmentation scheme contributed to a              
targeting policy that generated higher incremental profits than alternate policies.  
Another strategy is to take advantage of local randomization with respect to time or some               
other variable. ​Liaukonyte et al. (2015) measured changes in brand website traffic and             
conversions in narrow two-minute windows around the airing times of television advertisements.            
They based the assumption of quasi-random advertisement treatment times on a detailed            
understanding of television networks’ sales practices, which resulted in quasi-random ordering of            
advertisements within commercial breaks. This helped to ensure that systematic differences           
between traffic and conversions in pre-ad and post-ad windows of time should be attributable              
solely to the presence of the TV ads. Narayanan and Kalyanam (2015) studied position effects in                
search advertisements by using local randomness in position when competing advertisers were            
very close to the threshold of winning or losing the bid for a particular position. This local                 
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randomness allows for any differences in subsequent behaviors by consumers to be attributed to              
the position the ad was in. 
Finally, advertising exposure may be influenced by factors that are arguably independent            
of consumers’ preferences for the brands being advertised. This is the strategy found in              
Hartmann and Klapper (2018), who use quasi-random geographic variation in exposure to ads             
during the Super Bowl to study the effects of ads in the beer and soda categories. Probability of                  
exposure to Super Bowl ads depends on the performance of a consumer’s local team. Super               
Bowl ads are planned at the national level many months before the event, so advertising levels                
should be independent of shocks to local audience sizes.  
These examples demonstrate that advertisers can measure some ad campaign effects           
without relying on randomized experiments. But extra work is required to identify these             
situations, and they may not cover all the scenarios relevant to advertising decision making.  
 ​Future Research Opportunities 
Measuring the returns to all of a firm’s digital advertising expenditures is a daunting task,               
especially if the goal is to do so continuously and to immediately incorporate insights into the                
next advertising decision. Competent, expensive, large-scale attempts to estimate ad effects have            
failed to measure effects with reasonable precision.  
Below we outline some questions that we hope researchers consider for the future and              
offer some brief thoughts on how to make progress on them. 
1. Advertisers can improve the usefulness of observational models. One strategy is to            
practice continuous experimentation across geographies, media and groups of consumers,          
building more random variation into the data (Zantedeschi, Feit and Bradlow 2017). For             
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example, some digital advertising platforms offer targeting at the zip code level, which             
could enable greater statistical power than traditional market-level randomizations. It          
would be useful to understand how firms could efficiently design this experimentation            
and how to incorporate it into existing models. 
2. Firms can produce and leverage larger panel data sets to improve statistical power. Most              
advertising experiments are implemented in traditional static split/test designs. However,          
large panel datasets may offer increased statistical power (Berman and Feit 2018). For             
example, if the timing of advertising treatment can be randomized, treatment/control           
comparisons could potentially be made within individual consumers, thereby removing          
confounding individual fixed effects. A few firms can track both ad exposures and             
conversions in single-source customer data (e.g., Apple, AT&T, Google, Verizon, etc.).           
Market research firms or internet service providers are probably best positioned to create             
single-source panel data that measure both ad exposures and ad responses for a large              
number of brands, although doing so would require compliance with data privacy rules.             
There may also remain concerns about endogenous person/time based targeting if ads are             
delivered nonrandomly. 
3. Advertising agencies could develop approaches that integrate ad effect measurement with           
advertising procurement. One such approach was described in Lewis and Wong (2018)            
and implemented by an agency called Nanigans; advertisement bids are manipulated to            
induce exogenous variation in advertisement selection. Waisman et al. (2019) addressed a            
similar problem at JD.com by using a multi-armed bandit approach to combine            
continuous experimentation with optimal exploitation of experimental findings. 
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4. It may be possible to develop new quasi-experimental designs for digital advertising. A             
variety of such strategies have been used in other media. For example, television ad              
effects have recently been estimated using such instrumental variables as advertising           
treatment discontinuities at geographic television market borders (Shapiro 2018),         
exogenous shocks to TV ad demand during elections (Sinkinson and Starc 2018),            
exogenous TV ad insertion timing (e.g., Du, Xu and Wilbur 2019, among others), and              
assignments of TV networks to local cable channel numbers (Biswas, Dube and Simonov             
2019). It may be possible to find and exploit similar exogenous discontinuities in digital              
advertising markets in order to measure causal ad effects in observational data. For             
example, Hill et al. (2015) show that, under particular assumptions, variation in ad             
viewability can help to measure ad effects, since approximately 45% of ads rendered             
never appear in the viewable portion of a user’s screen.  
5. Firms may be able to integrate the results from observational models and randomized             
experiments. Some firms use experiments for tactical decisions (e.g., does this new ad             
design outperform the previous design?), whereas they rely on MMMs for strategic            
decisions (e.g., how much budget should we allocate to search versus display?). The             
information contained in the experiment could help inform the aggregate model, but it is              
not as simple as feeding the results of the experiment into the MMM. One possibility is                
that effects from experiments could be imposed as informative priors when estimating the             
MMM. Whatever the solution, many marketing measurement firms are actively searching           
for a unified measurement model to help deliver on this broad goal. 
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6. Managers may be able to embed experimentation within their profit-maximizing          
objective. The estimation of causal effects produces an input--the ad effect--intended to            
aid a manager’s decision-making process. Ideally, the decision to experiment and to            
integrate experimental findings into profit maximization can help the manager to make            
use of the results for subsequent marketing decisions. Feit and Berman (2019) provide a              
recent example of such a framing. 
7. Digital ad sellers may require techniques to validate their experimentation platforms. An            
increasing number of platforms offer experimentation services to help measure ad effects.            
Experimentation on ad platforms typically allows the advertiser to achieve greater scale,            
and the platform’s control of the experiment should help it develop higher-quality            
measurement technology. However, ad platforms also face a possible credibility problem,           
as advertisers may worry that the platforms have an incentive to inflate ad effectiveness              
estimates. To date, we are unaware of any systematic external audits or validations of the               6
experimental tools that platforms provide to advertisers.  
8. As more platforms offer experimentation as a service and more advertisers take            
advantage of this capability, it is unclear how marketers should interpret the treatment             
effects obtained when these effects depend on competitors’ advertising policies. An           
experiment delivers the ad effect that is incremental conditional on all other marketing             
activities in the market. Lin et al. (2019) provide a framework for interpreting ad effects               
obtained under parallel experimentation. Future work could provide guidance on how to            
6 There are also challenges and conflicting incentives if platforms try to estimate interactions between ads on 
competing platforms. For example, it would be difficult for Google to credibly offer advertisers a tool to estimate 
interactions between Google ads and Facebook ads. See, e.g., 
https://marketingland.com/where-is-google-attribution-256098 
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best generalize experimental ad effects, which may require the advertiser to form beliefs             
over competitors’ future policies.  
In summary, advertising effect measurement can increase advertising profits but good           
solutions are often unavailable. Ad effects are typically small and conversions are highly             
variable, so conclusive experiments are costly and rare. Observational data are plentiful but             
statistical analyses often do not uncover causal effects because advertisements are allocated            
strategically in ways that correlate with treatment. Although many people may share the intuition              
that it should be possible to design large-scale studies to systematically estimate ad effects, it is                
not yet clear when that goal will be achieved.  
 
Organizational Frictions and Inefficiencies  
 
Classical economic theories of market efficiency assume that purchasers allocate budgets to            
maximize their own welfare. However, markets for digital ads are intermediated by specialists             
whose self-interested actions may distort advertising decisions.  
Principal/agent problems and moral hazard are well-known sources of economic          
inefficiency. Generally speaking, asymmetric information enables agents to extract inefficient          
information rents from principals (Laffont and Martimort 2001). Perhaps the best known            
example is the dead-weight loss due to double-marginalization in retail pricing, which results             
from the divergence of manufacturer and retailer interests in a distribution channel. However,             
contracting problems have received limited attention in the specific context of digital advertising             
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markets. For example, many marketers ask digital advertising agencies to evaluate their own             
performance; under what conditions and contracts are agencies incentivized to report truthfully? 
We discuss two types of organizational inefficiencies arising in the digital advertising            
ecosystem. Intra-firm inefficiencies may result from misalignments between corporate officers,          
functional departments or business units within a firm due to different incentives or strategic              
objectives. Inter-firm inefficiencies may occur between marketing organizations and their          
external agencies, between competing agencies serving the same marketing client, between           
complementors within a value chain, or between colluding purchasers and sellers of advertising. 
Intra-firm Inefficiencies 
Chief Financial Officers often set marketing budgets and review marketing financial           
performance, a common source of tension within a firm (McKinsey 2013). Many finance             
executives believe that marketing executives should be able to measure return on advertising             
spend (Fitz 2018). As explained previously, such beliefs may be misplaced. Misalignment of             
internal beliefs and incentives may distort marketing tactics. Marketing managers may hire            
outside consultants to shift blame away from themselves in the event of poor or unmeasurable               
outcomes. For example, they may use retargeting campaigns, which send advertisements to            
shoppers who previously viewed the firm’s website and therefore have a higher expected             
baseline propensity to purchase. This creates a positive correlation between ad exposure and             
conversion. Lacking better causal metrics, managers may incorrectly present inflated lift metrics            
derived from correlations  (Lambrecht and Tucker 2013; Sahni, Narayanan and Kalyanam 2019). 
Another potential unintended consequence of an internal desire to measure ad effects is a              
distortion between short-run and long-run objectives. It is seldom possible to reliably estimate             
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advertising effects on long-run outcomes, such as brand attitudes (Du, Joo, and Wilbur, 2019). In               
contrast, direct response campaigns focus on short-run actions that are easier to reliably link to               
ad exposure. Tension between long-run and short-run objectives is difficult to quantify, but it is               
possible that under-investing in brand-building advertising could reduce long-run profits. Also           
pertinent in this context is the potential misalignment between the firm’s time horizon and that of                
the manager, with the manager often taking a more short-run view than the firm as a whole. 
A third type of intra-firm inefficiency may result from misalignment between functional            
groups within the organization. Previous research has shown that poor integration of marketing             
and sales teams may lead to suboptimal advertising policies and customer focus (Smith,             
Gopalakrishna and Chatterjee 2006; Homburg, Jensen and Krohmer 2008). Marketing goals may            
conflict with other functional groups as well, such as when the marketing objectives are              
misaligned with those of the procurement department. For example, procurement may use a             
reverse auction to award a contract to an advertising agency in order to meet a goal of                 
minimizing expenditures. The low-bidding agency may then provide a lower quality of service or              
fail to fully realize marketing objectives (Neff 2015). 
Finally, distinct business units, brands or campaigns within the same firm may enter             
rivalrous bids on the same advertising inventory. For example, Narayanan and Kalyanam (2015)             
showed that after a large retailer acquired three of its rivals, the four brands continued to                
compete with each other by entering rivalrous bids in advertising keyword auctions.  
Inter-firm Inefficiencies 
Many digital advertisers have replaced the traditional agency-of-record model with a complex            
array of external agencies. When a consumer requests a web page, any subset of the following                
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players may be involved in delivering each digital display ad impression: publisher, ad server,              
supply-side platform, ad network, ad exchange, demand-side platform, multiple data          
management platforms, third-party verifiers, ad agency, and finally the advertiser (Choi et al.             
2019). Each agent takes a cut of the advertising transaction. ANA (2017) concluded that “58               
cents of each dollar ultimately purchased media inventory and audience exposure from a             
publisher, with 42 cents of programmatic investment consumed by supply chain data and             
transaction fees.” Therefore, the share of digital ad spend going to intermediaries is nearly triple               
the traditional 15% agency commission, although it is split between many more entities in the               
programmatic advertising supply chain. 
In addition to the programmatic marketplace, advertisers can purchase guaranteed          
inventory. In such transactions, the advertiser specifies the parameters of the purchase (e.g.,             
targeted demographics, number of ads to be delivered, time frame, etc.) and the agency quotes a                
price. However, K2 Intelligence (2016) documented widespread obfuscation of agency mark-ups           
in such transactions. Arbitrage may reduce market efficiency due to moral hazard and             
asymmetric information between advertiser and agency, although agencies have countered that           
they can add value to low-cost advertising inventory by applying analytics.  
Another type of inefficiency may arise when advertisers fail to coordinate agencies            
whose work generates spillovers across marketing channels. For example, a large body of             
research has found significant spillovers between advertising placements in traditional media and            
digital activities such as brand search, website traffic, online sales and social media             
conversations. Few marketers are known to coordinate their advertising activity to account for             7
7 See, e.g., Dinner et al., 2014, Fossen and Schweidel 2017, Joo et al. 2014, Lewis and Reiley 2013, Liaukonyte et                     
al. 2015, Du, Xu and Wilbur 2019, among others, for effects of TV ads on digital behaviors. Lewis and Nguyen                    
(2015) document spillovers from digital display advertising to search behaviors. 
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such spillovers. An integrated channel would consider the effect of traditional advertising on             
volume of online search, types of keyword searched, search advertising expenditure and sales,             
and would quantify spillovers to allocate advertising budgets across media (Kim and            
Balachander 2017). However, the typical approach is for marketers to hire specialist agencies for              
each individual medium (e.g., traditional advertising, search engine marketing, social          
networking, search engine optimization, website analytics, etc.), each of whom operates           
independently and competes for a larger share of the marketer’s advertising budget. 
Another type of inefficiency related to advertising agencies is how to properly align             
incentives to produce efficient advertising creative content. On one hand, advertising agencies’            
creative ideas can be stolen during the pitch process, especially when clients work with multiple               
agencies (Dan 2014). Therefore, some agencies may not reveal the full idea during the              
contracting process, potentially leading to adverse selection or under-investment in idea           
production (Horsky, Horsky and Zeithammer 2016). On the other hand, advertisers have            
difficulty evaluating the quality of agencies’ creative strategies due to the complexity and high              
dimensionality of the messaging problem. Although messaging content is still largely driven by             
human intuition, there is increasing movement toward algorithmic production and validation of            
advertising messages in digital environments. 
Three recent trends affect the market for advertising agency services. First, there is a              
long-term trend toward in-housing, in which marketers create internal advertising agencies.           
In-housing is used primarily when firms have internal creative abilities or straightforward            
advertising requirements (Horsky 2006). ANA (2018) surveyed large advertisers, finding that           
78% of advertisers had in-house agencies in 2018, up from 42% in 2008; and also that 90% of                  
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those advertisers continue to work with external agencies in addition to their internal teams.              
Second, digital platforms have simplified their customer interfaces, a move which may            
encourage some advertisers to forego agency services. For example, Google recently made            
“smart display campaigns” the default interface to Google Ads. The streamlined purchase            
process relieves the advertiser of control over bidding, ad placement, user targeting and final              
control over the ad creative. However, advertisers using this interface may pay advertising costs              
that exceed advertising revenues, as they no longer can enter a maximum bid per click. Third,                
there is an emerging trend toward large advertisers requesting log-level files (i.e.,            
impression-level data) from supply chain partners such as advertising exchanges and publishers            
(Sluis 2019). Data sharing enables advertisers to monitor partner agencies and suppliers, trim             
wasteful spending and find undervalued inventory.  
A different inter-firm inefficiency may occur when advertisers compete in advertising           
auctions with complementors within the same value chain. For example, Hilton and Expedia             
both sell Hilton rooms in New York, and Expedia takes a commission when it sells a Hilton                 
room, yet both place search ads on keywords like “hotel New York.” Cooperative advertising              
policies may even exacerbate this competition; Hilton may subsidize the advertising           
expenditures of Expedia, even though this directly increases Hilton’s keyword advertising costs            
by making the keyword auctions more competitive. Cao and Ke (2019) and Jerath et al. (2019)                
examine such practices. 
Finally, there are inefficiencies which may increase advertisers’ profits at the expense of             
overall market efficiency. One such effect may occur when competing advertisers use a common              
advertising agency, as doing so may coordinate marketing policies or facilitate information            
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sharing (Villas-Boas 1994). Another may occur when the structure of programmatic advertising            
marketplaces facilitates collusion between purchasers. Digital advertisements are sold in          
high-frequency auctions with repeated contact among bidders, creating ripe conditions for           
collusive bidding strategies and punishments for defection. Decarolis and Rovigatti (2019) found            
that advertising agency consolidation is associated with decreased costs in keyword auctions            
when merging agencies represent competing bidders. There has been a recent trend toward             
global consolidation of advertising agencies (Pathak 2018), suggesting that such effects may be             
considerable. 
Future research opportunities 
 There are a number of important research opportunities within this area. 
1. Recent theoretical work in information economics has introduced Bayesian persuasion          
models and the analysis of strategic information design (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011,            
Bergemann and Morris 2016). Bayesian persuasion models characterize optimal         
informational strategies (i.e., what message to send, to whom, and when or how much              
information to reveal) to influence receivers’ decisions. This seems to be a promising             
theoretical framework on which to build an understanding of optimal advertising           
strategies for advertising content, targeting, and platform design (Mayzlin and Shin 2011;            
Fuchs et al. 2016; Zhong 2018). 
2. Principal/agent and theory of the firm-style analyses have rarely been applied to            
advertising agencies. It may be that such settings can be understood with straightforward             
applications of canonical models. However, given the particular institutional details, we           
suspect there is substantial scope to extend existing theories in the process of applying              
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them to advertising phenomena. Future research could include normative guidelines          
about how optimal contract terms depend on features of a market and the contracting              
parties. Contract terms likely affect incentive alignment, effort elicitation, payment          
models, in-housing/outsourcing decisions, and agency selection and coordination.  
3. There are opportunities to further develop and improve techniques to optimize digital            
advertising content and context. Machine learning has demonstrated progress in          
identifying sentiments (Cambria et al. 2017) across a wide variety of unstructured data             
including text (e.g., Netzer et al. 2012), images (e.g., Liu et al. 2018) and video (e.g.,                
Pérez-Rosas et al. 2013). The meaning of advertising content depends on the context             
(Poria et al. 2017, Rafieian and Yoganarasimhan 2019), such that algorithms are needed             
to detect and appropriately understand the context and work with multimodal data            
(Soleymani et al. 2017). Similar opportunities may be available when a marketer can             
access log files from multiple partners, as the data may be used to optimize advertising               
frequency, quantify the impact of context on conversion, optimize procurement          
techniques or evaluate ad agency services.  
4. Perhaps the most promising area for research involves designing auction and advertising            
allocation systems that more effectively align the incentives of the parties involved (e.g.,             
Hu, Shin and Tang 2016). Johnson and Lewis (2015) propose a           
cost-per-incremental-action (CPIA) pricing model for advertising, with the goal of          
aligning all participants’ objectives on profit maximization for the advertiser, thereby           
reducing the misaligned incentives that exist in common advertising pricing models.           
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Additional research is needed to test such models in the field and to adapt them to various                 
digital advertising markets. 
 
Ad Blocking 
 
Description and Background 
Early digital advertising efforts developed intrusive formats such as pop-up ads or autoplaying             
audio/video ads. This led to consumer demand for ad blockers, applications that allow users to               
passively block advertising from showing up in their browsers. Most ad blockers came in the               
form of free-to-use browser extensions enforcing a set of community-defined rules for ads.             
Recent estimates of ad blocking prevalence vary from 8% to 47% (Searls 2019). In mid-2019               
Google incorporated ad blocking features into its market-leading Chrome browser, while           
continuing to enable third-party ad blockers.  
The phenomenon of ad blocking highlights an important tension in the current digital             
advertising ecosystem. Consumers are flooded by ads, most of which are not interesting or              
relevant. Prior to ad blocking technology, consumers had no choice but to tolerate the ads; most                
users were not willing to pay for most content, so content providers relied on advertising               
revenues. Ad blocking threatens this model, as advertisers’ most sought after consumer segments             
are often the most likely to install ad blockers.  
The most popular ad blockers work by intercepting browser requests to lists of known ad               
servers, so advertisers are not charged for blocked ads. However, some ad blockers are more               
aggressive: they only block ads after they are requested, thereby wasting the advertiser’s money.              
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One ad blocker, AdNauseam, even ​clicks ​on all blocked ads, in order to inject noise into the user                  
data that underpins digital advertising. 
Platforms such as web browsers and mobile operating systems enable or restrict ad             
blocking services. However, platforms that sell ads have conflicting incentives. Their revenues            
depend on consumer experience but also advertising exposures. It is thus not surprising that              
critics argue that Google blocks relatively few ads and interferes with competing ad blockers.              
Mobile operating systems assert more control over applications than traditional desktop           
operating systems. Apple and Google have rules about apps that interfere with how other apps               
work, making it hard to offer blocking of in-app ads. 
Ad-supported publishers are perhaps most harmed by ad blocking. Facebook and some            
other sites deliver ads and content from the same servers, preventing ad blockers from              
identifying which page elements are ads. Other publishers seek to detect ad blocker usage and               
withhold content from consumers who do not allow ads; Zhu et al. (2018) found that 30% of the                  
top 10,000 websites detect ad blockers. Some publishers, including Facebook, invest heavily in             
website engineering to circumvent ad blockers and unblock ads. Other publishers explicitly            
request that users whitelist the site, i.e. selectively disable their ad blocker, so the site’s ads may                 
be displayed. Software developers have responded with ad blocker-blocker-blockers, which          
enables the consumer’s browser to obfuscate ad blocker usage, thereby preventing publishers            
from withholding content.  
The overall effect of ad blocking on advertisers, consumers and publishers is unclear.             
Using the circulation spiral theory of newspapers (e.g., Gabzewicz, Garella and Sonnac 2007),             
one might predict that ad blockers will put advertising-supported media out of business. By              
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reducing ad revenues, ad blockers increase direct-access prices and thereby reduce publishers’            
incentives to produce high-quality content. Taken to its extreme, ad blockers would destroy the              
ad-supported internet and thereby become irrelevant, as there would be no more ads to block. A                
contrary argument holds that ad blocking serves consumer interests: some ad blockers even             
positioned themselves as a consumer movement (Katona and Sarvary 2018). Ad blockers say             
they only block the most intrusive ads and that users can whitelist any site they want. In fact, ad                   
blockers whitelist some sites by default.  
This brings us to an important question: how do the ad blockers make money? Most ad                
blockers do not directly charge users for downloads or ad blocking services. The typical model               
used by ad blockers is to demand payment from publishers in exchange for             
whitelisting-by-default. If the publisher pays and conforms to some guidelines about ad formats             
and intrusiveness, the ads will be displayed to ad block users by default. Large publishers               
typically pay 30% of ad revenue that would otherwise be blocked; small publishers can be               
whitelisted for free if they agree to follow programs such as the “acceptable ads” standard. 
Publishers have argued that such practices amount to extortion. There have been            
numerous lawsuits. Some of the most important cases have taken place in Germany where the               
company that makes Adblock Plus, Eyeo, is based. The German Supreme Court has ruled that ad                
blocking and the practice of soliciting payment for whitelisting is legal (Ha 2018). 
Future Research Opportunities 
The phenomenon of ad blocking raises a range of future research opportunities.  
1. It is interesting to study how consumers trade off the intrinsic benefits of content              
consumption with advertising quantity, advertising nuisance and subscription prices.         
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Huang, Reiley and Riabov (2018) ran experiments that showed that increased advertising            
on Pandora.com directly decreased consumers’ site usage and increased consumer          
subscriptions. It would be interesting to measure similar effects in other contexts; to             
condition on the nuisance level of the ads served; and to estimate effects of ads on                
adoption dates of ad blockers, among other relevant outcome variables. It also would be              
interesting to study how design elements within publisher requests for whitelisting might            
correlate with response metrics. 
2. There may be better ways for browsers and ad blockers to improve mechanisms to              
allocate attention. On one hand, browsers that specialize in privacy and ad blocking have              
not realized high market shares. On the other hand, there are some notable experiments              
ongoing. For example, the browser Brave implements the “Basic Attention Token” to            
reward users for looking at ads and send money to publishers the user likes. New designs                
might take hints available from recent literature on privacy, which shows that consumer             
valuations of privacy respond strongly to framing and context (Acquisti, John and            
Loewenstein 2013, Winegar and  Sunstein 2019).  
3. Recent work by Shiller, Waldfogel and Ryan (2018) finds that, as a larger proportion of a                
site’s visitors use ad blockers, the site’s quality declines. Further research is needed. How              
does a site’s revenue loss from ad blocking compare with payments to ad blockers? When               
do sites switch from ads to paid subscription models, unblockable “native advertising” or             
other blocking-proof business models? Similar questions can be asked for advertisers,           
especially those whose target customer segments are most likely to use ad blockers. How              
do ad blocking and whitelisting affect ad placements and ad prices? 
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4. It is interesting to understand how ad blocking changes product market outcomes. There             
are a few recent theoretical pieces on the interaction between publishers and ad blockers              
(Gritckevich et al. 2019) and differentiation between publishers (Despotakis et al. 2017),            
but there are more directions to explore. For example, how do ad blockers compete with               
each other? Blocking more ads than a rival ad blocker may attract more consumers, and it                
may also impact the value to publishers of paying to be whitelisted by default. It would                
be interesting to quantify these tradeoffs, as they likely rely on the extent of consumer               
multihoming, both across publishers and across ad blockers. 
5. There is also the question of how advertisers react to ad blocking. Chen and Liu (2019)                
argue that ad blocking can incentivize higher quality ads when ads send informative             
signals. Other fundamental questions should also be addressed. If ad blocking reduces the             
overall supply of advertising space, that must raise the overall price of reaching             
customers. The increase could be disproportionate for more ad-averse consumers. How           
does that impact advertisers? Intuitively, the direct effect should be negative, but perhaps             
limited advertising also reduces price competition (Dukes and Gal-Or 2005) or increases            
the effects of ads that are not blocked. Future research could dig deeper to examine how                
other dimensions of advertising content are affected by ad blocking. If a brand has to pay                
more to reach a consumer, the brand might change how much it focuses on              
communicating a single piece of information (e.g. price, product feature, etc.) or alter the              
mix of entertaining and informative content contained in the ad. 
6. Platforms’ business models may incentivize them to set ad blocking defaults or limits in              
mobile operating systems and desktop browser software. Overall, it seems likely that            
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platforms selling ads will restrict ad blocking more than platforms that charge consumers             
directly for devices and software, in order to limit harm to advertising revenues.  
 
Digital Advertising Fraud 
 
Description and Background  
Digital advertising fraud is a collection of practices that misrepresent advertising inventory or             
disguise machines as humans in order to steal advertising budgets. It is fundamentally difficult or               
impossible to measure, but it appears to be widespread. eMarketer (2019b) reported that recent              8
estimates of fraud vary from $6.5 to $19 billion, and that fraudsters target high-price ad               
impressions, new markets and new media. Adobe reported in 2018 that about 28% of website               
traffic showed “strong non-human signals.” The IAB Tech Lab reported that “just 59.8% of              
clicks could be confirmed as human traffic” (AdWeek 2019). Pixalate (2018) estimated that             
10-15% of programmatic desktop advertising was invalid traffic. Davies (2019) reported that            
“28% of global mobile media budgets are wasted on fraud.” Sweeney (2019) reported that 95%               
of marketing executives surveyed said that digital media must become more reliable and 21%              
said they have cut ad spend due to inaccurate, questionable or false reporting.  
We know of six basic motivations to commit advertising fraud.  
1) Publishers may over-report or misrepresent audience metrics to increase ad revenues.  
8 Skepticism is appropriate when interpreting fraud measurements. Fraud is defined by intention, which is not 
directly observable in ad data. Indirect measures of ad fraud trade off subjective risks of false positive observations 
of fraud against false negative detections of valid ad exposures. Fraud detection firms might over-report fraud to 
attract business; ad sellers might under-report fraud to reassure clients. 
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2) Advertisers may click competitors’ ads to harm rivals’ market inferences, ad budget or             
brand awareness; or to reduce competition in ad auctions by depleting a rival’s budget.  
3) A firm may commit detectable advertising fraud that ostensibly benefits a rival, with the              
goal of inducing a platform or other intermediary to punish the rival.  
4) Advertising market intermediaries, including agencies, ad networks, demand-side        
platforms and supply-side platforms, may misrepresent the inventory or the bids they            
have available in an effort to alter ad prices, ad sales, or commissions. They also may                
deviate from contracts to manipulate ad auctions, as in the recent bid caching scandal.  
5) Publishers or agencies may distribute advertisements surreptitiously or insert false          
information into advertisers’ conversion tracking systems to claim undue credit from           
advertisers who pay publishers per conversion achieved.  
6) Firms or individuals may create fraudulent profiles on social networks to falsify measures             
of influence, ad clicks, or seemingly organic discussions (astroturfing). 
Collectively, there are dozens of known schemes to commit ad fraud. 
Fraud techniques that use machines to mimic human behavior are often enabled by             
“botnets,” which consist of a central server and a host of malware-infected computers. The server               
directs connected machines to take specific actions in ways that resemble their owners’ organic              
behaviors. Machine activity is therefore difficult to distinguish from human activity.  
Security researchers have publicized several ​ad hoc ​botnet discoveries. For example, the            
discovery of the 3ve botnet in 2018 led to the first criminal charges filed for advertising fraud.                 
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The indictment stated that “more than 1.7 million infected computers… download[ed] fabricated            
webpages and load[ed] ads...”   9
Another set of fraud techniques misrepresents advertising inventory, as several publishers           
have shown. The ​Financial Times did not sell inventory in programmatic advertising            
marketplaces, but it found fraudulent FT.com ad inventory offered in 25 ad exchanges, with              
fraudulent video inventory exceeding truly available inventory by a factor of 30. ​The Guardian              
purchased intermediaries’ Guardian.com video inventory on open advertising exchanges,         
reporting that 72% of ads purchased falsely claimed to occur on Guardian.com. 
Large digital platforms have been inconsistent in their claims about digital advertising            
fraud. Google states in its advertiser-facing webpages that “we protect you from invalid activity              
and advertising fraud” and describes a variety of approaches. However, internal communications            
filed as evidence in a 2017 lawsuit indicated that Google recalled fraudulent funds from              
publishers but lacked an internal system to return those funds to defrauded advertisers, and that               
Google’s advertiser contracts did not require the company to offer refunds to defrauded             
advertisers (AdTrader 2018). Facebook states that “we believe fake accounts are measured            
correctly within the limitations to our measurement systems.” However, Facebook does not            
specifically define fake accounts, although its community standards do prohibit “accounts that            
are fake” without elaboration. Facebook’s Community Standards Enforcement Reports show that           
9 The indictment further stated “To create the illusion that real human internet users were viewing the advertisements 
loaded onto these fabricated websites, the defendants programmed the datacenter servers to simulate the internet 
activity of human internet users: browsing the internet through a fake browser, using a fake mouse to move around 
and scroll down a webpage, starting and stopping a video player midway, and falsely appearing to be signed into 
Facebook. Furthermore, the defendants …[made] it appear that the datacenter servers were residential computers 
belonging to individual human internet users who were subscribed to various residential internet service providers.” 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/two-international-cybercriminal-rings-dismantled 
-and-eight-defendants-indicted-causing 
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Facebook “took action on” 6.6 billion fake accounts in the 12 months ending in September 2019,                
but did not specify the actions taken. Facebook has restated advertising metrics numerous times              
(Peterson 2017).  
There are two types of efforts to address digital advertising fraud. One type of effort               
increases market transparency and accountability to reduce the incidence of advertising supply            
chain participants from stealing from each other. For example, the IAB Tech Lab defined the               
ads.txt standard in 2017 to enable publishers to publicly identify authorized advertising sellers             
and resellers, so that buyers can audit ads.txt files to avoid unauthorized sellers. Publisher              
adoption is widespread. Newer standards ads.cert, sellers.json and the OpenRTB Supply Chain            
Object enable similar disclosures by other market participants. Anecdotally, it appears that these             
efforts have meaningfully reduced fraud borne by supply chain participants. 
The other type of anti-fraud effort helps advertisers to avoid paying for fraudulent ads ​ex               
ante ​and to seek reimbursement for fraud detected ​ex post​. Most importantly, there are a range of                 
firms that specialize in ad fraud detection, including some that partner with large digital              
advertising platforms to directly analyze some data. There are also industry collaborations, such             
as the Trustworthy Accountability Group, which publishes a monthly Data Center IP List, a              
“common list of [Internet Protocol] addresses with invalid traffic coming from data centers             
where human traffic is not expected to originate.” There are also industry-standard contractual             
language intended to help advertisers obtain relief for fraudulent ads. Measurement difficulties            
make it challenging to know how advertiser-facing fraud has changed over time. Advertiser             
concern and awareness about fraud have increased, but at the same time, fraudsters have grown               
more sophisticated and discovery of large-scale botnets has increased.  
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The issues underlying digital ad fraud are nontransparency and nonverifiability of human            
recipients of ads. Advertising delivery systems seldom require proof of humanity; for example,             
publishers do not require users to solve a reCAPTCHA before serving ads. Ads are delivered               
when a computer requests a page from a web server, placing ad exposures in the set of activities                  
that are trivial for botnets to perform programmatically. As Vinton Cerf, co-creator of the              
internet protocol, put it, “We didn’t focus on how you could wreck this system intentionally.”               
Digital ad fraud is often described as a cat-and-mouse game in which fraudsters develop new               
tactics when previous tactics have been neutralized.  
We emphasize the role of botnets because evasion of detection is of central importance to               
those who would commit advertising fraud. Fraud that can be detected can be reversed, with               
charges reverting back to the client marketers and fraudsters being excluded from established             
advertising networks. Therefore, competent ad fraud is, by definition, fraud that is sufficiently             
unlikely to be detected. Major advertising networks say that they seek to detect advertising fraud,               
but they do not fully explain the specific techniques they use. Fraud detectors are hamstrung in                
gaining advertisers’ trust: sharing their precise fraud detection algorithms could help           
unscrupulous actors to avoid fraud detection. There is also a credibility problem: Wilbur and Zhu               
(2009) proved that, under general conditions, digital advertising platforms’ revenues may rise            
when they fail to detect ad fraud, even when advertisers adjust their bids based on expected fraud                 
levels. To summarize, small advertisers are forced to trust in partners’ efforts to detect fraud,               
even though the partners get paid every time their detection algorithms fail. 
Future Research Opportunities 
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The academic literature on ad fraud is relatively sparse. There have been a few theoretical studies                
examining how advertising market conditions and business models impact various players’           
incentives to engage in fraud (e.g., Chen et al. 2015). There is a more sizable literature in                 
computer science proposing algorithms to detect particular fraud schemes (e.g., Behdad et al.             
2012). Finally, there are empirical papers that relate fraud prevalence to other market conditions              
in order to offer guidance to firms. For example, Edelman and Brandi (2015) relate marketers’               
monitoring efforts to online affiliate fraud. They found that monitoring by outside specialists is              
more effective at punishing clear violations of marketer rules, whereas internal marketing staff             
are more effective at punishing borderline rule violations.  
More research is needed. We see five areas as particularly important. 
1. Theoretical analyses have seldom considered the economic antecedents and         
consequences of digital ad fraud. We think it would be interesting to model digital              
advertising as a credence good as many advertisers cannot reliably measure ad effects.             
An open question is how credence goods markets function when delivery of the service is               
only partially verifiable, and how optimal contracting terms depend on the properties of             
the transaction. A related question is whether there are strategies buyers or market makers              
can adopt independently to improve market efficiency in such settings. Model-based           
predictions might help to identify opportunities to improve market regulations. 
2. Another area of opportunity is to help platforms and fraud detection firms design better              
approaches to detect and reverse ad fraud. In general, the topic of how to attack machine                
learning algorithms and how to resist attack is a topic of active research (e.g., Wang et al.                 
2019). Consideration of adversarial methods may help firms to anticipate and defend            
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against future developments in fraud technology. It also may help to identify            
opportunities to incentivize humans to prove their humanity in order to better measure             
when ads are being delivered to people as opposed to bots. 
3. It may be interesting to adapt market designs and regulations from other contexts. For              
example, securities fraud may have been affected by government regulations or           
dispersion of trading across competing stock markets. There may also be lessons            
available from other examples of fraud, such as insurance fraud or identity theft.             
Successful efforts to detect, prevent, reverse or deter fraudulent activity in other settings             
may have implications for effective management of digital advertising fraud. 
4. It is important to understand empirical predictors and impacts of fraud. If institutional             
ethics guidelines allow, researchers could simply run experiments by purchasing various           
types of botnet actions, as they are available cheaply online; then observe how fraudulent              
traffic changes market outcomes. Ideally, an approach might be developed that enables            
individual agencies or advertisers to audit platforms’, publishers’ and fraud detection           
firms’ claims about audiences delivered and fraud prevented.  
5. Another approach could use certain events as discontinuities in quasi-experimental          
designs, such as privacy regulation changes, publishers’ adoption dates of ads.txt or other             
transparency standards, or major public disclosures of botnets or ad fraud schemes.            
Examining how market data and indicators of fraudulent activity change around event            
times could show how fraud responds to incentives and distorts markets. 
We close by highlighting two hypotheses related to ad fraud and allocative efficiency.             
First, there are trade-offs between consumer privacy, market transparency and fraud detection. In             
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particular, the more signals there are about human identity and activity, the more information is               
available to potentially distinguish humans from machines. Therefore, it seems possible that            
increasing consumer privacy may also hinder detection of ad fraud and market transparency.             
Second, we think the application of blockchain technology is promising in digital advertising             
markets. However, widespread adoption of new standards requires coordinated action. Will the            
walled gardens adopt blockchain or other anti-fraud technologies? As an example, Ads.txt            
adoption was boosted significantly when Google adopted and promoted the standard, but Google             
did not actively support the standard until after a significant number of publishers adopted it. To                
date, several blockchain-based solutions have been proposed for digital ad markets, but we are              
not aware of any that have achieved significant traction. New standards may need to anticipate               
the chicken-and-egg problem to get ad purchasers, sellers and intermediaries on board. 
 
Broader Discussion 
 
Interactions between Inefficiencies 
We have discussed each source of inefficiency in isolation, but they may interact to exacerbate               
market-level inefficiencies. A prominent example is when advertising agencies’ private          
incentives depart from marketing principals’ profit incentives to measure credible ad effects.            
This interaction could help to explain the relative scarcity of experimental evidence about             
advertising effects, and the frequent misinterpretation of observational methods as yielding           
causal ad effects.  
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Other harmful interactions between inefficiencies appear likely. Agencies may misreport          
the extent of ad blocking or ad fraud to their clients, especially if negative information might                
reduce the client’s advertising budget and, consequently, the agency’s commission. Another           
prominent example is that ad fraud or ad blocking may contribute to the statistical challenge of                
measuring ad effects by reducing the number of valid advertising exposures delivered to             
consumers in treatment and control cells of an experiment.  
Policy-Relevant Research Opportunities 
Several high-profile regulatory reports have recommended new regulations for digital advertising           
markets. Those reports have described many important topics extensively (e.g., antitrust, brand            
safety, disinformation, consumer privacy, market transparency, etc.). However, they have          
covered the four themes treated in this article in less detail. We now consider the question of how                  
research could help to inform broader policy considerations, in addition to the four individual              
themes treated previously.  
Ultimately, digital advertising markets exist to create value for two types of agents they              
aim to connect: consumers and marketers. Consumers supply attention and realize utility from             
advertisements, media content and advertised products. Marketers buy ads and realize profits            
from product sales. All other relevant parties are intermediaries enabling interactions between            
consumers and marketers. Therefore, consumer welfare and producer profits should be the two             
primary concerns in designing government policy. 
Consumer-level questions​. It is particularly important to understand how advertisements          
affect consumer search for information about products and prices. Some advertising may            
enhance product-market outcomes for consumers whereas other ads may suppress product search            
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and reduce competition in the product market. It is also important to uncover when advertising               
may have direct negative impacts on consumer utility, as is suggested by the large literature on                
advertising avoidance, and the extensive use of ad blockers. There is existing literature on these               
topics, but more comprehensive and systematic evidence is needed to guide policy due to the               
heterogeneity among consumers, advertisers, and the variety of advertising channels and           
messages.  
Marketer-level questions​. ​The ad effect measurement section explains some significant          
obstacles to profit-maximizing advertising decisions. An important topic that is not well            
documented is how different types of firms make different types of advertising decisions. Some              
advertisers are known to be more sophisticated and make more data-driven decisions than others,              
but we are aware of little public evidence about the financial returns to data-driven advertising               
decision-making. There are similar questions about estimating the returns to using specific new             
tools in the advertising process, such as automated ad content generation, programmatic            
advertising purchases, fraud detection and brand safety monitoring. Another open question is            
how different types of firms should structure their external advertising agencies and what             
contracting mechanisms might be optimal in what situations. Differences in advertiser           
objectives, capabilities, ownership structures, and firm size may help to explain why some firms              
make more data-driven decisions than other firms. Overall, there is substantial scope to better              
understand the antecedents and consequences of advertiser behavior. 
Industry-level questions​. There are not many examples of successful regulation in           
multi-sided platform industries like digital advertising markets. It is unclear how to optimally             
trade off conflicting goals among various players. One relevant trade-off may occur between             
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consumers’ interests, such as privacy, and advertisers’ interests, such as fraud detection. Another             
relevant trade-off may occur between large platforms’ interests in acquiring early-stage           
companies and potential competitors’ incentives to enter and innovate. 
It would also be interesting to consider what metrics regulators can use to measure the               
efficiency of digital advertising markets. It seems likely that regulations that entrench            
incumbents may deter potential entrants, so entry and innovations might be potential indicators             
of well-functioning markets. It may be that ad blocking installations decrease with market             
performance for consumers and therefore might underpin relevant metrics. Perhaps advertiser           
usage of experimentation platforms, and subsequent changes in advertising spending, could help            
to indicate how digital advertising markets are serving advertisers’ interests.  
Finally, there is a question of whether regulatory regimes will be robust to platforms’              
active preparations to be regulated. For example, some technology companies have been            
anticipating antitrust regulation for years (Athey and Luca 2019). If regulatory policy is not              
robust to adversarial interference, it could exacerbate the problems it seeks to resolve. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Digital advertising markets offer numerous innovations over traditional advertising. Perhaps          
most notable is the immediacy with which a small business can target and advertise to local                
consumers, along with the increased variety of advertising formats, relevance, market structures            
and interactivity. However, as with most technological innovations, the shift to digital            
advertising has produced costs as well as benefits. We have reviewed four common issues that               
 
 44 
are likely to hinder allocative efficiency in digital advertising markets. Most marketers either do              
not or cannot measure incremental ad effects; uncertainty about ad effects may distort market              
demand for advertising. Numerous intermediaries separate marketers from publishers, each of           
whom takes a cut of advertising expenditures and has its own private information and incentives,               
leading to asymmetric information and moral hazard. Consumers use ad blocking software to             
passively prevent advertisements from being displayed, resulting in misappropriated advertising          
revenues and reduced incentives to provide media content. Advertising fraud misrepresents           
advertising opportunities and directs ad exposures to machines to steal advertising budgets.  
We hope the discussion is helpful to academics, scientists employed by advertising            
companies, policy makers and executives as they seek to understand modern digital advertising             
markets. We do not claim that these four issues are necessarily more important than others; we                
have focused on them because we believe that they are less well understood than other topics that                 
have received more careful study. Such topics as antitrust, brand safety, disinformation,            
consumer privacy, and market transparency are also important policy considerations. We have            
not taken a position on whether or how digital advertising markets should be regulated, but we                
do prefer policy makers to have full information and hope this article may be helpful toward that                 
goal. Overall, we hope this survey of market inefficiencies in digital advertising markets might              
help to develop scientific literature and better inform the policy making process. Many             
opportunities remain and much work has yet to be done. 
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